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 Abstract 
 
There are moments when philosophy captures the educator's attention. Such an occasion was the 
opening night of the 1990 annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science 
Teaching. Ernst von Glasersfeld gave a highly stimulating lecture on "radical constructivism." 
Radical constructivism is an epistemological philosophy that divorces knowing from any notion that 
reality is the referent of knowledge. Radical constructivists argue that adopting this view, rather than 
realist views, will help teachers improve science instruction. This, however, would mean a dramatic 
shift away from critical realism which has deep historical roots in Western thought, and which 
arguably was critical for the development of modern science. Furthermore, one must question what 
effect radical constructivism would actually have on science teaching. Many would argue that there 
is little reason to think that ontological beliefs are a more critical factor in teacher behavior than 
social and material factors. Nevertheless, ontological belief is an interesting aspect of culture and 
could be incorporated into a general discussion of cultural issues during a program of science teacher 
education. The thorough discussion of ontological issues, however, is probably best left for graduate 
education. 
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  The good Dr. Johnson and James Boswell were walking done a 
London street one day discussing George Berkeley's philosophy of 
immaterialism. Dr. Johnson, unconvinced by Berkeley's logic, said to 
Boswell, "I refute it thus!" Upon which he turned and soundly kicked 
the street curb with his big toe - much to Boswell's amusement! 
 Along with Boswell, one is amused. Of course, Samuel Johnson's refutation of 
immaterialism was no philosophical threat to Berkeley. What Johnson did was to present 
dramatically the wisdom of common folk and everyday, ordinary life. For most people philosophy is 
an esoteric, arcane discipline with little apparent practical value. Unfortunately, that is not always a 
wise view. For example, Duschl (1985) argued that for 25 years science curriculum developers 
ignored concurrent development in the philosophy of science, resulting in impoverished curricula. 
There are however, moments when philosophy captures the educator's attention. Such an occasion 
was the opening night of the 1990 annual meeting of the National Association for Research in 
Science Teaching. Ernst von Glasersfeld gave a highly stimulating lecture on "radical 
constructivism." Of course, the term constructivism is not new to science education researchers. One 
frequently finds the term in the literature. Good (1991) has recently commented that most science 
education researchers have boarded the "constructivist express." He asks, "is constructivism the new 
religion in science education?" 
 Constructivism refers to a view of learning derived from Piaget's concepts of assimilation 
and adaptation, a view further developed in Ausubel and Novak's work on meaningful learning. As 
such, this view of constructivism can be appropriately termed, pedagogical constructivism. The 
gravamen of von Glasersfeld's position, and what is new for many science educators, is the linkage 
of pedagogical constructivism with radical constructivism. The latter is an epistemological 
philosophy that divorces knowing from any notion that reality is the referent of knowledge. And von 
Glasersfeld does not view this is a recondite philosophy of little practical import. "[I]t is this 
construction of the individual's subjective reality which ... should be of interest to practitioners and 
researchers in education and, in particular, to the teachers of science" (1989a, p.122). von 
Glasersfeld (1989b) emphasizes the critical nature of the linkage between radical constructivism and 
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pedagogical constructivism by asserting that disassociation results, not in pedagogical 
constructivism, but in trivial constructivism. The purpose of this article is first to examine briefly the 
historical roots of critical realism in Western thought, to highlight the dramatic nature of the shift in 
thought that the radical constructivists are seeking, and then to critically consider the relevance of 
radical constructivism in science teacher education. 
The Insignificance of Reality 
 According to von Glasersfeld the philosophy of radical constructivism, "discards the notion 
that knowledge could or should be a representation of an observer-independent world-in-itself and 
replaces it with the demand that the conceptual constructs we call knowledge be viable in the 
experiential world of the knowing subject" (1989a, p.122). Interpretations of experience are all that 
one can know. One accepts the validity of interpretations in so far as they are pragmatically viable. 
The appeal of this position is that it renders moot an historical paradox in Western philosophy, 
particularly philosophies of realism. 
 Radical Constructivism was conceived as an attempt to circumvent the paradox of 
traditional epistemology that springs from a perennial assumption that is inextricably 
knitted into Western philosophy: the assumption that knowledge may be called 
"true" only if it can be considered a more or less accurate representation of a world 
that exists "in itself", prior to and independent of the knower's experience of it. The 
paradox arises, because the works of philosophers by and large imply, if not 
explicitly claim, that they embody a path towards Truth and True representations of 
the world, yet none of them has been able to provide a feasible test for the accuracy 
of such representations. (von Glasersfeld, 1989b, p.2) 
von Glasersfeld summarizes the radical constructivist position by paraphrasing an early 18th 
Century philosopher, Giambattista Vico: 
 God alone can know the real world, because He knows how and of what He has 
created it. In contrast, the human knower can know only what the human knower has 
constructed. (1989a, p.123) 
To say the least, this is an ironic application of the "God of the gaps" argument. The difference is the 
claim that knowledge of objective reality, i.e., what God alone possesses, is no longer important. 
What is important are the constructions of knowledge and their judged viability. 
 That objective knowledge about a real world is unobtainable is, of course, an old charge. 
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Mortimer Adler noted that the question of how ideas can actually represent knowledge of an 
objective reality underlines all the unresolved "riddles and perplexities of later empiricism" (1974, p. 
X). However, the failure of realism "to provide a feasible test for the accuracy" of representations is 
hardly a fatal flaw unless one wishes to accept the position that all systems of thought are fatally 
flawed. All systems of thought are founded on first principles of one sort or another, the title of von 
Glasersfeld (1989b) notwithstanding. As C. S. Lewis argued, "It is simply no use trying to see 
through first principles ... If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly 
transparent world is an invisible world. To see through all things is the same as not to see" (1947, 
p.91). For the critical realist, the fundamental first principle is that reality is knowable. 
 Confidence in an objectively knowable reality is "inextricably knitted into Western 
philosophy" (1989b, p.2) as von Glasersfeld rightly observed. In ancient Palestine, Moses turned 
aside to see a burning bush and to ask "why the bush [was] not burned up" (Exodus 3.3). His view of 
the world was grounded in a concept of creation, which implies order and purpose, and thus the 
basis for a knowable reality. Much later, voluntaristic theology of Medieval Europe provided a 
formal expression of this view and marked a significant European departure from the organismic 
influences of ancient Greece (Glover, 1984). 
"And Yet It Moves" 
 In Greek rationalism an object was thought to be known by ascertaining its essence. 
Perception may lead to essence. Once the essence of an object is known, however, the properties of 
the object are rationally deducible from its essence, not established by experience. In contrast, 
voluntaristic theology, as the name implies, does not imbue objects with essence. Without essence 
an object can only be known by experience (Foster, 1934, 1935, 1936; also see Powell, 1972). In the 
Judeo-Christian tradition humans have essence because they are living, sentient beings begotten by 
other living, sentient beings. One can observe the characteristics of the mental, social, and material 
nature of human beings and from this come to some understanding of what humans are like. 
However, one person comes to knowledge of another individual through a complex, interactive 
process colloquially referred to as "getting to know" someone. In contrast, a created object such as a 
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chair is known solely by it characteristics. The assurance that one can know anything about a chair is 
warranted by virtue of the chair having been created with order and purpose. Analogously, the West 
grew up, so to speak, with the idea that reality having been created can also be known by 
observation. To state it more directly, creation implies purposeful order. The order and purpose of 
reality warrant the assumption that experience can lead to objective knowledge. In this, one has the 
basis for natural law which arguably "was an essential condition for the emergence of modern 
science in Western Europe" (Powell, 1972, p.5). Moses turned aside fully expecting that his 
observations of the burning bush would help him to understand the phenomenon. 
 It is important to note that the concept of creation, and its reputation as an important concept 
in the history of Western ideas, has suffered considerable damage as the result of unfortunate 20th 
Century disputes concerning the teaching of evolution. Historically, the concept of creation has 
provided the West with an ontological understanding of what the world is really like. At times it has 
also been used simplistically to provide a mechanistic understanding of how the world came to its 
present condition. The latter (e.g., creation science) has long been discredited. The former remains a 
powerful aspect of Western thought though its religious foundation has been weakened (Templeton, 
1982).   
 Radical constructivists have a different view. They argue that radical constructivism can be 
traced to Copernicus, which in effect contradicts the above discussion (von Glasersfeld, 1989b, p.3). 
As evidence, radical constructivists quote Andreas Osiander's preface in the original publication of 
De Revolutionibus. Osiander wrote that the repercussions of Copernicus' work should not be feared 
because the works of astronomers are not to be regarded as truth, but only efficient calculating 
devices. Given the revolutionary nature of the shift from geocentrism to heliocentrism, Osiander's 
caveat was a political necessity. However, in the reading of Copernicus quite a different view is 
evident: 
 Any apparent motion of the firmament is the result, not of the firmament itself 
moving, but of the Earth's motion. The Earth, together with the material elements 
lying around it, goes through a complete rotation on its axis each day, while the 
firmament and highest heaven remain unaltered. (De Revolutionibus, quoted in 
Toulmin & Goodfield, 1961, p.172) 
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Copernicus was aware that the Ptolemaic system was consistent with numerical data. However, he 
also believed, "despite everything else, the truth about the Heavens could be discovered by rational 
investigation" (Toulmin & Goodfield, 1961, p.178). Viability of a theory was simply not good 
enough for Copernicus. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that Galileo accepted Osiander's 
political position on De Revolutionibus. Hodson wrote, "it was precisely because Galileo took a 
realist interpretation of Copernican theory, and set about solving the problems it created, that 
progress was made" (1982b, p.23). And one final consideration. Galileo's under-the-breath response 
to a coerced recantation was, "and yet it moves." If Galileo had been a radical constructivist, he 
never would have gone to trial (see Wallace, 1986). 
Durer Vs Kandinsky 
 Despite the centrality of objective knowledge in the Western world view, what is called 
knowledge about the world changes. The realist recognizes that knowledge at any given time 
approximates reality and that the quest for accuracy is endless. The realist understands that an 
individual constructs knowledge of reality from sense perceptions which are subject to many 
influences. The realist is not naive, but critical. Knowledge of reality is not like a photograph, but 
more like representational art. In a Durer painting, for example: 
 there is little of sensuous beauty; but the rude, stark outlines of life itself, the literal-
minded dwelling on the last detail of the imaginative vision, the intense seriousness 
of the preoccupation with the furniture of practical life, whether in the creased 
strength of those faces of his merchant friends - "I think the more exact and like a 
man a picture is the better the work," he said ... (Randall, 1940, p.127) 
Representational art and photographs are not easily confused. The vicissitude of knowledge is 
widely recognized. Nevertheless, the goal is exactitude, albeit elusive. 
 The radical constructivist having grown tired of the quest to know reality declares reality 
unimportant. It is only the construction, in and of itself, that is important. To carry further the artistic 
metaphor, radically constructed knowledge is a form of modernism similar to modern art: 
 Modernism ... denies the primacy of an outside reality, as given. It seeks either to 
rearrange that reality, or to retreat to the self's interior, to private experience as the 
source of its concerns and aesthetic preoccupations ... There is an emphasis on the 
self as touchstone of understanding and on the activity of the knower rather than the 
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character of the object as the source of knowledge ... Thus one discerns the intentions 
of modern painting ... to break up ordered space ... to bridge the distance between 
object and spectator, to "thrust" itself on the viewer and establish itself immediately 
by impact. (Bell, 1976, p.110,112) 
As with a Wassily Kandinsky painting, there is no intention to represent the natural world. The value 
of the art is in its impact. The value of radically constructed knowledge is in its viability. One does 
not worry that knowledge match reality, only that knowledge allow the useful prediction of 
experience, its impact. But when it does so predict, what metaphysic does viability reinforce? The 
eminent physicist Cecil Frank Powell noted, "all our experience of the development of science 
suggests that there is indeed an order in nature which we can discover..." (1972, p.5). I am inclined 
to think that viability reinforces the estimation that knowledge is approaching reality, and in fact 
undermines radical constructivism. 
 In sum, the argument here is that a knowable, objective reality is a key feature of the 
historical Western world view, and one that was crucial for the birth and nurture of modern science. 
In 1991, a radical constructivist will do science because the power of experimental science has been 
previously established in the years since Galileo. One has cause to doubt that in an earlier age radical 
constructivism would have motivated the exploration of something that had no known potential. 
Furthermore, even if one were now to adopt radical constructivism the viability test that it offers 
may actually undermine the first principles of radical constructivism, rather then support them. 
Perhaps one should say, the success of science undermines radical constructivism for all but those 
who have an a priori commitment to radical constructivism. In fact, I would go so far as to say, the 
real issue at hand is a priori commitments to different ontological positions. Westerners have for 
centuries lived with the difficulties of realism. The question is thus, why would one choose to make 
an a priori commitment to radical constructivism? 
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Linking Ontology and Pedagogy 
 The radical constructivist may well respond that whether or not radical constructivism could 
give birth and nurture to a young science is irrelevant since science is in fact established. They may 
also cite the increasing attention that philosophers of science have given to subjectivist views of 
knowledge. These views range from the moderate position taken by Kuhn in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions to the extremism of Feyerabend's Against Method. More to the point of the 
above question, however, radical constructivists argue that their position promotes better teaching 
and thus better learning. To bolster this assertion the radical constructivists point to research such as 
Clement (1987) and Briscoe et al. (1990). 
 Pedagogical constructivism rejects the idea that an identity exists between knowledge within 
and knowledge without. For example, we may agree that at the end of a lesson a student has 
successfully gained knowledge about plants, but is there an identity between the student's knowledge 
(knowledge within) and the knowledge the teacher presented in the instructional process (knowledge 
without)? Pedagogical constructivism says no. Learning is not the relatively simple process of 
transplanting knowledge from the teacher or textbook to the student. Rather, learning is an 
interpretive process. Learning occurs when a person under the influence of experience (in this 
example teaching) constructs personal knowledge that makes the experience meaningful. In the 
tradition of pragmatism, this learning is subsequently validated or invalidated by further experience. 
This view of learning suggests the use of instructional procedures that foster higher order cognitive 
thinking as exemplified in Clement (1987). 
 The unique position of radical constructivists is that ontology and pedagogy are vitally 
linked. Radical constructivists maintain that constructivist teaching will increase with teacher 
acceptance of radical constructivist ontology. Figure #1 is a graphic portrayal of the radical-
pedagogical constructivist linkage. The four spheres represent ontology, epistemology, psychology, 
and pedagogy. The radical constructivists discount the first sphere as unknowable. They collapse or 
link the second and third spheres with the equation, knowledge=knowing; and they assert that this 
equation logically leads to a particular view of pedagogy. The linkage argument is: If I understand 
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that reality is inherently unknowable, then I also will understand that what I know is a construction 
and the only meaningful reality. It is only logical that methods of instruction should facilitate the 
personal construction of meaning and stress higher order cognition. Radical constructivists also 
maintain that the alternative to this view is naive realism: If I understand that the world is real and 
knowable, then I also will understand that knowledge corresponds to reality. It is only logical then 
that instruction be the transplanting of knowledge to the learner, i.e., rote learning. 
 Based on this argument, radical constructivists maintain that teacher education should work 
at persuading teachers to adopt radical constructivist ontology (von Glasersfeld, 1989a). The realist 
teacher who asks students to memorize facts because the facts are objective, once converted to 
radical constructivism will more readily adopt pedagogical constructivist teaching strategies 
(Briscoe et al., 1990). 
Wishful Thinking 
 Does this dramatic connection between ontology and pedagogy really exist? Many science 
educators have ample reason to think that any teacher who makes extensive use of memorization 
will do so independent of ontological beliefs. Such a teacher, once converted to radical 
constructivism, would have the students memorize constructed facts. After all, what is there to keep 
this teacher from arguing that students need to know these facts because these facts have been shown 
to be viable? Or worse, what is to keep the teacher from using memorization because teaching for 
memorization is easiest or the least time consuming way to teach, regardless of ontology? The 
reasons that teachers have for using memorization are countless, and they rarely have to do with 
philosophical issues. 
 Consider a different type of example. Virtually all science educators including classroom 
teachers will say, when asked, that science should be taught "hands on." Nevertheless, one of the 
most consistent criticisms of science teaching is that it is not taught hands on. And the reasons are 
rarely philosophic. They have more to do with facilities, equipment, tolerance for disorder and noise, 
etc. Certainly beliefs play a significant role in behavior. It is nonetheless very difficult to predict 
accurately specific behavior when in possession of only limited knowledge about beliefs. It 
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is even more difficult when little or no consideration is given to the influence of the social and 
material environments. Research may yet establish a significant link between ontology and 
pedagogy, but at this point the research in this area does not allow for a wide range of important 
beliefs held by teachers, nor for the external influences upon teachers. The research that looks at 
student and teacher beliefs is indeed interesting. To achieve greater validity, however, research on 
teacher education and teacher change as influenced by ontology and epistemology needs to broaden 
its scope. 
 The emphasis on radical constructivism raises concerns relative to research and to teacher 
education. The argument for adopting radical constructivism has a meager research base especially 
when one considers the dramatic nature of the change of view point that is being advocated. At that, 
the research invoked is narrowly conceived and does not include other significant influences on 
teaching practice. At this point, the danger of an ontological focus in research is that it will obstruct 
the researcher's vision of other factors influencing science teacher behavior. In defence of 
researchers such as Clement (1987) it should be noted that the research cited by radical 
constructivists is often pedagogical constructivist research done independent of ontological 
considerations. The researcher needs to see ontological views as a part of a nexus of beliefs, 
including beliefs about self, students, learning, and the nature and purpose of education. 
Implications for Science Teacher Education 
 It is clear that radical constructivists advise making radical constructivism an important part 
of science teacher education (von Glasersfeld, 1989a&b). Many will find it equally clear that the 
lack of a solid research foundation attenuates the argument for promoting radical constructivism in 
the education of teachers. Even if the argument were stronger, one must remember that time for the 
preparation of classroom science teachers is a limited commodity to be used wisely. How much time 
can the science education professor afford to spend on issues of ontology? Science education 
professors generally agree on the importance of the philosophy of science in the preparation of 
teachers (Hodson, 1985), but as things are, philosophy is one of many important topics competing 
for scarce time. It is hard to conceive of a justification for the amount of additional time that would 
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be required to do justice to the complexities of ontological arguments. The thorough discussion of 
ontological issues is probably best left for graduate education. 
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 This is not to imply that issues of ontology and related issues of epistemology are 
unimportant. Actually, these issues have a great deal to do with culture, a topic of rising interest in 
science education. Currently, classroom discussions about culture usually focus on students rather 
than teachers. It can be argued though, that one focus is as important as the other. Figure 2 is an 
illustration that provides a context for raising the issue of teacher culture, including metaphysical 
issues. Blocks A and B represent cultural issues while block C represents environment. View of 
persons refers first to culturally based understandings of self and others, in this case the teacher and 
students respectively. Metaphysics refers to culturally based understandings of what the world is 
like. School environment is where the first two meet, and together they bear on instruction or teacher 
behavior. For introductory purposes a professor may wish to use this illustration along with readings 
for each block. For example, with regard to view of persons one might assign Contreras & Lee 
(1990); for school environment, McLaughlin et al. (1986); and for metaphysics, Glasersfeld (1989a) 
and Hodson (1982a&b). Without taking too much time, the illustration accompanied by appropriate 
readings will provoke a discussion that focuses attention on several ways in which culture can 
influence teacher behavior. This strikes me as both an appropriate and valuable activity in science 
teacher education. If radical constructivism is to have a greater part in science teacher education than 
this, concerned researchers and theorists must first improve their case. 
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